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Why and how to be a Dialetheist
Manuel Bremer
Institute of Philosophy, University of Düsseldorf
In the rst part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e.
why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been
criticised as irrational or self-refutating. erefore the second part of the paper
outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn
out to be both believable and assertable.e argument proceeds by setting out basic
principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
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1. Introduction
Dialetheism is the claim that some contradictions are true. For anyone trai-
ned in standard logic and raised in the belief that already in antiquity Aris-
totle settled once and for all that there is the Law of Non-Contradiction di-
aletheism sounds not just false, but bizarre.
On the other hand people contradict each other quite oen and a cou-
ple of theories have turned out to be inconsistent. Nevertheless the people
who held inconsistent beliefs have not (at the time of holding these beliefs)
believed just anything, as the standard rule of ex contradictione qoudlibet
would have it. us paraconsistent logics (logics that invalidate ex contra-
dictione. . . and thus can tolerate even provable contradictions) have gained
interest and lots of them are investigated and explored nowadays.
Dialetheism is strong paraconsistency in the sense that one cannot just
tolerate some contradictions, but one should endorse some of them. is
certainly needs argument. In this paper the rst part gives one of the main
arguments why to be a dialetheist.
Ever since its arrival dialetheism (the thesis that there are true contradic-
tions) has beenmet with the proverbial “incredulous stare”, not only because
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of the inconsistent ontology of Routley’s “noneism” (Routley 1979), but also
with respect to the dialetheist’s claim that one can knowingly believe and
assert contradictions. Priest in the paper introducing his “logic of paradox”
LP (Priest 1979) admits that the thesis of dialetheism is a dialetheia itself,
and seems to be content with this. In his book In Contradiction (Priest 1987)
he argues that one can avoid dialetheism being a dialetheia itself if one is
prepared to give up contraposition for the conditional in Convention (T).
Nevertheless he defends that one can believe and assert contradictions. Up
to now (see some of the papers in Priest et al. 2004 or Field 2008) criticism
of dialetheism has focused on the problems what the status of dialetheism it-
self is and how itmay be possible to believe knowingly contradictions. In the
second part of this paper it is argued that within dialetheism the resources
are available to claim that dialetheism is true only (i.e. not false at the same
time). Furthermore there may be occasions on which it is rational to believe
and/or even assert contradictions, without thereby positioning oneself on a
slippery slope towards an attitude of “anything goes”.
2. Why to be a Dialetheist
e main motivation for dialetheism is universality as a feature of language
and cognition. Universality means that we are aiming at—and supposedly
capable of—a theory of, say, language in general, that is not just of this or
that language or languages of this or that formal structure. And this the-
ory is expressed in language, so that at least some language can be its own
meta-language (with respect to all interesting properties of that language,
semantics included). Universality means as well that we use fundamental
concepts like denotation or true unrestrictedly.
A language can talk consistently about its own syntax.is presupposes
expressive resources to name expressions/terms of the language and to rep-
resent syntactic properties. Once a language contains a basic systemof arith-
metic (the system Q) this is feasible. Within such a language L one can give
a general structural description of what is a well-formed expression, what
expressions are generalizations, and one can even dene what counts as a
derivation or a proof in that language. Being provable in L as a syntactic
property of a formula can be dened within language L. Even if there was a
hierarchy of language levels in L, given that the levels have some index there
are formula that consistently talk about all such indices or talk about indices
that are above the level such a formula is on. Syntactic hierarchies in contrast
to semantic hierarchies are not strictly downwards, even in standard logic.
A language L is semantically closed i L is able to talk about its own
semantics.e meanings of the terms of L can be given within L then.
If a language is semantically closed it can not only talk about its own
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expressions (by suitable names or quotation marks), but it can also apply
semantic properties to these terms, and even to the terms that express se-
mantic properties:
(1) Sentence number (1) is grammatical.
(2) is sentence contains six meaningful words.
(3) e third sentence displayed in this list is true.
Here some formula refers to itself by a description/name occurring in that
formula. An infamous example is the Liar:
(λ) λ is false.
e Liar is a xed point for the predicate ‘( ) is false’ (or ‘not-true’), saying ‘I
am false’. Now consider (λ): If λ is true, then λ is false, because the general
term in λ ‘( ) is false’ should apply to the singular term ‘λ’. If λ is false, then
λ is true, because λ is just saying that it is false. So we get:
(4) True(λ) ≡ False(λ)
or given that we have a two-valued logic where ‘false’ is just the opposite of
‘true’:
(5) True(λ) ≡ ∼True(λ)
So λ is an antinomy: a sentence α where we have a proof for α and ∼ α.
Usually (e.g. given standard propositional logic PC) this means we also have
a proof of α ∧ ∼α.
As an example let us walk through the two proofs in case of the Liar:
[Proof of ∼λ]. If λ is true, then λ is false (by simple properties of being
true).is is inconsistent, i.e. the assumption of λ being true leads to incon-
sistency, so by the rule of Negation-Introduction (∼I) we get that λ cannot
be true.
[Proof of λ]. If (λ) is false, then λ is true, just saying that it is false.
is is once again inconsistent, i.e. the assumption of λ being false leads to
inconsistency so by (∼I) we get that λ cannot be false.
[Proof of λ ∧ ∼λ]. Taking the two proofs together byConjunction-Intro-
duction (∧I) we get:
(6) λ ∧ ∼λ
respectively
(7) True(λ) ∧ ∼True(λ)
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ere aremore harmless semantically self-referential sentences, like (2).e
Liar is the basic case of bad semantic self-referentiality. It bears its badness
on its sleeve. It is not hidden. Within a language that is semantically closed
semantic self-reference may be hidden, however. Suppose today you only
utter a single statement
(8) What the pope declares today is true.
and as a contingent matter of fact he only says that day:
(9) Everything N.N. says today is false.
e Liar is an antinomy. Dialetheism claims that it cannot be prevented,
since a natural language is a semantically closed language. Since, further-
more, the antinomy can be proved, it has to be true.
So the dialetheist has to show three things:
I e contradictions can be proven in a sound non-standard logic, if
we use a semantically closed language.
II We have to use a semantically closed language.
III ere is no satisfactory alternative to accepting the antinomies (i.e.
the attempts to prevent them either fail or have consequences worse
than dialetheism).
I will briey outline the arguments for these three claims (for the details see
Bremer 2005).
(ad I) To reason from the provability of an antinomy to its truth we need
at least one correct/sound paraconsistent logical system. ere are several.
Besides that the reasoning about the Liar employs some properties of nega-
tion and Tarski’s Convention (T)
(T) ‘p’ is true (in L) if and only if p.
ascribing truth to the name of a sentence/statement1 is true just in case we
can use that sentence truly, i.e. it is true.is convention is not tied to a spe-
cic theory of truth, since it may be taken either as a minimal condition, a
statement of correspondence or a disquotational analysis. Even if one does
1 For the discussions here there is no important dierence between statements, sentences
and closed formula. So whereas strictly speaking only a sentence used in an assertoric
utterance to make a statement is true or false I keep to the loose common standard of
talking of the truth of sentences.
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not hold Convention (T) to be true there are other semantic antinomies us-
ing even less controversial concepts like ‘applying to’ for a predicate or ‘de-
noting’ for a singular term (for example Grelling’s Paradox using the xed
point of the predicate ‘does not apply to itself ’).
True contradictions are said to be sentences such that α and ∼α are true.
How is that compatible with our concept of negation? How can we justify
that ‘∼’ behaving thus still expresses negation?
An intuitive acceptable concept of negation should support:
(MN) (i) If α is false, then the negation of α is true.
(ii) If α is true, then the negation of α is false.
ese conditions seem to express the idea that the negation of a sentence
α expresses the opposite of α, and a couple of paraconsistent logics (like
LP) satisfy these conditions. If ‘false’ and ‘not true’ are the same, the two
conditions just give us the ordinary truth table. (ad II) in the dialetheist’s
agenda:
e natural languages we use seem to be semantically closed. We can
express the antinomies in these languages. Natural languages have the re-
sources of naming and corresponding self-reference. Semantic properties
can be expressed in natural languages. Prima facie natural languages, there-
fore, are the very paradigm of universal languages. If somebody wants to
deny this he has the burden of proof. Our ordinary conception of our lan-
guage had to be seriously mistaken then! Usually the arguments against the
semantic closure are based just on the antinomies.
Especially philosophy cannot restrict itself to non-universal languages.
Philosophy does not want to deal only with the structure or conditions of
talking in some specic language or languages of some kind, but aims at a
theory of the basic structures and conditions of having a language in general.
is requires the corresponding resources to express the universal claims.
Universal theories of meaning, truth, knowledge etc. were not to have if
we can talk only from some meta-language “down” to some distinct object-
language. A general statement like
(10) Knowledge is true belief.
would be not well-formed.
But these are the very theories that philosophy is aer. And notwith-
standing their lip-service to hierarchy solutions of the antinomies most phi-
losophers propose their general theories of meaning, truth, belief, reference,
knowledge etc. ey are right to do the latter, since we have such univer-
sal concepts. We can investigate and formalize the logical structures of any
natural languages. at is one of the central tenets of logic and formaliza-
tion. We not only talk about properties of all (natural) languages, it seems
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even incoherent whether there could be two completely incommensurable
languages. Our concept of language, therefore, involves unity and univer-
sality.ere has to be a set of properties dening what a language is.ese
properties are preserved in change or translation. Without semantic closure
we would not be able to elucidate a concept that we seem to have! So I take
it that we need semantic closure. Nothing, but dialetheism seems to be able
to deliver it. ad (III) of the dialetheist’s agenda:
eir are twomajor alternatives to paraconsistent treatments of the anti-
nomies:
(IIIa) many-valued semantics or truth-value gaps
(IIIb) the hierarchy of semantic meta-languages
Both fail, but for dierent reasons. (IIIa)-type solutions solve some anti-
nomies, but the linguistic resources they employ in their formal framework
are sucient to generate new versions of the antinomies. (IIIb)-type solu-
tions result in an outrageous pragmatic self-contradiction. Let us turn to
(IIIa) rst: It has been claimed that the problems with the antinomies show
that the crucial sentence has no truth valuewhatsoever or some further value
besides ‘true’ and ‘false’. Antinomies, however, are no problem tied to biva-
lence. If the Liar sentence λ is taken as neither true nor false the reasoning
concerning sentence λ does not go through. at is right. e problem is
that the linguistic framework employed to solve this antinomy is suciently
rich to allow for new versions of the old antinomies, like the Liar. I take
a linguistic framework to consist of both the language dened as well as its
meta-linguistically expressed distinctions and semantics.ree-valuedness,
for example, is part of some linguistic framework, given the interpretation
of formulas in some semantics.
A general hypothesis of dialetheism is:
(LFT) A linguistic framework which is rich enough to avoid some of the
antinomies, generates its own versions of them.
is hypothesis is rather vague, but it can be illustrated on several versions
to deal with antinomies. With respect to three-valued approaches, one can
introduce a strengthened Liar, (λ′). If the (old) Liar (λ) is neither true nor
false, it is not true. A three-valued framework has two values (say ‘false’ and
‘undetermined’) opposite to ‘true’. But now we can say that (λ) is on this
opposite side, i.e. not true.is gives us a strengthened Liar:
(λ′) λ′ is not true.
We can argue again by cases—three cases now—and get a new antinomy:
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(10) True(λ′) ≡ Not-True(λ′)
A framework involving three truth values involves the implicit or explicit
validity of some principle like
(11) Not-True(α) ≡ False(α) ∨ Undetermined(α)
Even if ‘Not-True’ is not introduced as a truth-valuewithin the semantics,
the semantic framework has the expressive power to introduce this notion.
What we do here is to re-introduce a bifurcation within the realm of the
truth-values. ‘Not-True’ works like the notion of falsity in ordinary bivalent
semantics. (is forced bifurcation is always available. e trick introduc-
ing the strengthened Liar is independent from the number of truth-values
present.)
e strengthened Liar, therefore, might reside on the language level at
which we can express ‘Not-True’, and given the framework there has to be
some such level.
us (IIIa)-type solutions will not work! What is wrong with the hier-
archy solution [ad (IIIb)]? e main problem is not that at rst sight we
cannot nd these levels in ordinary language. at is a problem, since the
assumption of these levels would mean that there is some hidden syntactic
structure with no corresponding surface structure, although it is decisive for
truth! Such an analysis would be a major revision of our understanding of
our language! Nonetheless there are even deeper problems in store:
e main problem is that if there were these levels and if the theory was
true, the very statement of the theory and its given explanation (speaking in
general about all language levels) would be impossible. e hierarchy con-
ception says we are always talking from some level in the hierarchy, and at
the same time makes a general statement to the eect that constructing the
semantics of a language (level) we just go one level up.
Let us look at the details. Supposewe had a hierarchy of truth-predicates.
Each of them has an index i. Ascribing truth would be like:
(12) α is true-at-level-n (in L).
Now if indexes are numbers, we are able to talk about them in a suciently
rich language, able to talk about its own syntax. So we can built for each sen-
tence α the expression ‘the-level-of-α’. Consider then the supposedly avail-
able sentence:
(13) (13) is not true-at-level-of-(13).
is sentence has to occur somewhere in the hierarchy on pains of the inex-
pressibility of some truths or talk about indices. Let us call this level ‘true-13’;
then ‘true-at-level-of-(13)’ is identical to ‘true-13’. (T) applies at every level
of the hierarchy for sentences of that level:
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(14) True-13(α) if and only if α.
Applying (14) to (13) as a sentence at level 13 we get:
(15) True-13(13) if and only if (13).
And this yields a new antinomy:
(16) True-13(13) if and only if not true-13(13).
Being able to talk about the indexes simply re-introduces antinomies in the
context of semantic vocabulary. e only solution to resist the argument
above is to give up the assumption that (13) occurs somewhere in the hierar-
chy, has a level.en, however, no sentence that talks in this general fashion
about indexes is possible.e following sentence would be impossible too:
(17) e truth predicate of a level n is dened at level n+1.
is sentence, however, can be expressed in natural languages, which are
said to be captured. And (17) better be expressible if the theory of language
levels is to be expressed at all!—If sentences like (17) were impossible the
whole theory of (IIIb) would be inexpressible itself !
Being unable to make statements about the hierarchy in general means
that we are unable to understand the basic semantic concepts at all. So the
hierarchy conception leaves us hanging in the air concerning our ability to
understand semantic concepts at all! e hierarchy conception says we are
always talking from some level in the hierarchy, and at the same timemakes a
general statement to the eect that constructing the semantics of a language
(level) we just go one level up.
is is not just a contradiction. A contradiction one might suppose is
what a dialetheist is to accept anyway. e situation is worse. If the the-
ory is true—and, of course, as an adherent of the theory you believe it to be
true—something is impossible to do, but you just do it! Given the theory the
adherents are doing something impossible in the strict sense. What is done
by the adherent of the hierarchy solution is completely mysterious. Doing
the impossible seems to me evenmore bizarre than claiming that some con-
tradictions are true. Even if you do not think so, the failure of the hierarchy
solution is obvious: Dialetheismprovides semantic closure—so it claims—at
the cost of true contradictions; the hierarchy model implies either a mystery
or a true contradiction and gets nothing for that, only the absence of seman-
tic closure!
Dialetheism avoids mystery at the price of accepting some true contra-
dictions. With respect to the general hypothesis concerning the failure of
other solutions to the paradoxes one may rene the hypothesis by saying
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that either a linguistic framework will be rich enough to trade in new para-
doxes for the old, or it will employ concepts ineable within that framework
or simply excludes linguistic resources obviously present in ordinary lan-
guage.at is why one should be a dialetheist!
3. How to be a Dialetheist
Concerning a sentence there are several levels of commitment. Consider:
(18) α is true. [T⌜α⌝, ‘T’ being here a truth predicate]
(19) Believing α. [Bα]
(20) Rather concede α.
(21) Arm α (assert that α is true). [Aα]
(22) Abstain from an opinion on α. [∼Bα∧ ∼B∼α]
(23) Disbelieve α. [∼Bα]
(24) Reject α. [Rα]
(25) Believe the opposite of α. [B∼α]
(26) Assert the opposite of α. [A∼α]
(27) α is false. [F⌜α⌝, ‘F’ being a falsity predicate]
(28) e opposite of α is true. [T⌜∼α⌝]
Assertion as an speech act usually done in face of an audience commits one,
at least prima facie, to provide reasons for one’s beliefs, if challenged to do
so, whereas mere believe need not.ere is a dierence between abstaining
from a judgement and disbelieving α if one seems to have reasons against
believing α, but not against believing ∼α.ere is a dierence between dis-
belief and rejection if disbelief is based on seeming to have reasons against
believing α, and rejection on positively endorsing some reasons against α.
If these reasons are taken as suciently strong, one believes ∼α. ‘∼Bα’ may
cover disbelief, B∼α then being ‘believing the opposite’. A∼α is asserting the
opposite. For this speech act the term ‘rejection’ (Rα) might be appropriate.2
Consistency principles then might be:
(29) ∼(Aα ∧ A∼α)
2 Henceforth, at least, ‘rejection’ is used in that sense only.
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(30) ∼A(α ∧ ∼α)
(31) ∼B(α ∧ ∼α)
(32) ∼(Bα ∧ B∼α)
ese principles, of course, seem to forbid anything like dialetheism. What
thus seems intuitively so may not be ne grained enough, however, given
the occurrence of true contradictions. And standard logic in its treatment
of negation may level some distinctions that should be kept.
In standard logic (PC) rejection is equivalent to assertion of the oppo-
site, since there is no 3rd value. Arming α is rejecting ∼α, and vice versa.
Semantically we have:
α ∼α Tα Fα
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
α being not true means α is false, ‘false’ being a synonym for the truth of a
negation, expressed with ‘∼’. e (T)-scheme is taken in its contrapositive
form as well [∼α ≡∼T⌜α⌝]. erefore the standard logician endorses (29)–
(32). Typically consistency of belief is demanded:
(33) Bα → ∼B∼α [⇐⇒ ∼Bα ∨ ∼B∼α]
At least one of a sentence and its negation has to be disbelieved. Expressed
with a truth predicate one demands
(34) BT⌜α⌝→ ∼BT⌜∼α⌝
(35) BT⌜α⌝→ ∼BF⌜α⌝
For the standard epistemic logician
(36) Rα ≡AF⌜α⌝
may be taken as the very denition of ‘rejection’.
Truth concerns what is the case whether we believe it or not. Belief con-
cerns what we are willing to include in our inferring. What we believe we
take into account in our reasoning (belief is cognitive).
Generally, being provided with reasons for α is seen as the basis for be-
lieving α, given that the reasons for some γ incompatible with α are not
stronger.3
3 is proviso depends on the consistency requirement not to have Bα∧Bγ with ⊢ (α →∼γ)
[respectively: ⊢ (∼ (α ∧ γ))].
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Ona gullible approach to (perceptual) belief one believes every α one has
no reasons against. e best backing for a belief α is a proof of α. Having
reasons is superior to mere belief in the truth of α. Having no independent
access to the (ultimate) truth of α going with reasons is the rational way,
whatever the (ultimate) truth value of α is or turns out to be.
Given consistency and bivalence assumptions reasons against α may be
reasons in favour of ∼α, at least in non-empirical domains like semantics
where a closed world assumption may be less idealized.
Typically it is taken to be rational to assent to [to arm] what one be-
lieves. Assertion is to assent to or to arm what one believes. If one has a
belief α one also has the disposition to assert α. One does not need addi-
tional reasons to proceed from believing to asserting. On the other hand,
asserting α is done by a speaker confronting an audience (assertion is prag-
matic). Asserting α is done with a purpose in view of an audience, so that
this purpose exceeds using α in one’s processes of deliberation (this being
one’s self-satised belief that α). As an (speech) act with some purpose as-
serting has to meet the basic conditions of successful action plans, like
I the purpose is not achieved anyhow without my action
II this specic action is t to the purpose.
Asserting contradictions seems to fail both conditions, since there seems to
be no specic commitment on the side of the speaker.
Given that standard logic runs into diculties with antinomies also the
principles supposedly governing belief, denial and asserting (the opposite)
may need overhauling. Of special interest are now issues related to semantic
closure and the formulation of the dialetheist position itself. Conditions to
be met by dialetheism are:
I Dialetheism as a thesis should be asserted as being only/just true
(i.e. not being false at the same time).
II One should be able to say, without saying something false, that a
true sentence/statement is true.
III One should be able to express the semantic properties of all sen-
tences/statements (including the antinomies).
In meeting these conditions the dialetheist has to develop an understanding
of denial and rejection which does not equate believing α with disbelieving∼α and asserting α with rejecting ∼α.
Reasons against α that are not reasons for ∼α may be reasons that un-
dermine assumptions which usually support α. If α and ∼α are true at the
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same time reasons for ∼α are not—cannot be—reasons against α. (If neither
α nor ∼α has to be true, reasons against α are not per se reasons in favour of∼α.) On the other hand, since following reasons is the rational way having
reasons for α may lead one to accept α and having reasons for ∼α may lead
one to accept ∼α at the same time.
Dialetheism claims that some contradictions are true. So we have some
sentence λ with λ, ∼λ, T⌜λ⌝, T⌜∼λ⌝, F⌜λ⌝, F⌜∼λ⌝ to start with. e reasons
for this are that these contradictions are provable given some unassailable
principles and structures in a semantically closed language. Now, these anti-
nomies being true and being justied as true, by proving them, give all the
reasons to believe that they are true and thus to believe them (themselves).
So a dialetheist should believe
(37) e Liar is true.
thus
(38) e Liar
and thus (by the denition of the Liar)
(39) e Liar is false.
Giving up believing what one has proven seems to be a desperate and ad hoc
manoeuvre. So a dialetheist has inconsistent beliefs. She reasons using both
T⌜λ⌝ and F⌜λ⌝ if necessary.
Paraconsistent logics can level the distinction between object and meta-
language. A semantically closed language not only is able to talk about its
own expressions, but does contain at the same time its semantic expres-
sions. ese semantic expressions need not be taken as predicates (like a
truth predicate applying to the quotation of a sentence), but can be taken
as operators instead. One arrives at a paraconsistent language/logic which
allows truth value talk without previously quoting the sentences which are
evaluated.
To full the condition of dialetheism being expressible we need bivalent
truth operators working in the fashion of the following table:
α ∼α Tα Fα △α ▽α ○α ●α
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0,1 0,1 1 1 0 0 0 1
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‘△α’ says that α is true only, ‘▽α’ that α is false only, ‘○α’ says that α is
consistent (i.e. has only one truth value), ‘●α’ says that α is contradictory.
We can then say—and these being just true—that the Liar is true, false, not
simply true, not consistent, and so on. ‘T’ and ‘F’ are now understood as
operators applying to formulas/sentences not to quoted formulas/sentences.
us dialetheism can full the traditional condition on any decent the-
ory: that it claims to be just true (and not only as true as its negation). Di-
aletheism is thus no form of trivialism (that everything is true).e trivialist
proposes (∀α)(Tα∧T∼α) or (∀α)(Tα∧Fα).e dialetheist claims (∃α)(Tα∧
Fα), but also (∃α)(Tα∧∼T∼α), and (∃α)▽α. And given some formal sys-
tem some formulas can be exhibited having these properties (e.g., dening a
bottom particle  with▽ being valid). ⊺ can be dened as the top particle
with T(α ∨ ∼α), being true only. e bottom particle  can be dened as▽(α ∧ ∼α), being false only. Note that—in contrast to even the intuitionist
negation rules— ≡ (α ∧ ∼α) need not hold if α is a dialetheia, since then
T(α ∧ ∼α), and▽ is incompatible with T.
To have and use the (T)-scheme at the same time as these operators (be
it for the operator ‘T’ or ‘△’) we need some revisions in the logic of the
conditional, like giving up on the unrestricted validity of Contraposition.
Tα∧▽α is awell-formed formula, but false only.e language of this version
of dialetheism thus contains formula that can be evaluated only as being
simply false.ese formulas, of course, cannot be derived.
We do not need the details of all these restrictions here.e reader has
only to know the general idea of paraconsistent logics and the idea of “adap-
tive logics” (Batens 1989, 2000) to restrict some rules to consistent sentences
(respectively to retract some supposed consequences if the rules to derive
them employed, against the restrictions, some inconsistent sentences). A
paraconsistent logic like Priest’s LP can be developed into an adaptive logic
with a restricted form of Modus Ponens and Contraposition (Priest 1991).
Within paraconsistent logics “logics of formal inconsistency” (Marcos 2005)
employ consistency operators in the object language. Truth operators can
then be added. Blending these approaches one can have an adaptive para-
consistent logic which combines the extensional and intuitive truth condi-
tions of LP with the use of truth and consistency operators (Bremer 2005).
We suppose here that the dialetheist uses some such logic. Adaptive log-
ics employ standard logic in consistent context and with respect to consis-
tent objects and use a paraconsistent logic for the inconsistent cases. ey
are adaptive in that one proceeds on the assumption that one deals with a
consistent case only on explicit information that the context is inconsistent
some supposed consequences have to be retracted. Practically this works by
adding to natural deduction style derivation a further column in which one
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notes the consistency or normality assumptions or presuppositions that have
to be made when employing some critical rules of inference. For example,
the paraconsistent logic LP makes—as do paraconsistent logics typically—
Disjunctive Syllogism invalid; since LP, further on, uses the standard mate-
rial conditional this means thatModus Ponens is not valid in general; but it
is valid on the assumption that the antecedent ϕ of the conditional ϕ → ψ
used in an instance of Modus Ponens is a consistent statement. us not-
ing the assumption ○ϕ in the extra column of a derivation one can employ
Modus Ponens, but once it turns out by the internal dynamics of drawing
further consequences that ϕ was not consistent aer all, the derived line and
all lines dependent on it have to be retracted. We have to deal also with the
failure of substitution of identicals for inconsistent objects. Identity elimina-
tion, (=E), has to be restricted to consistent objects. We dene a consistency
predicate ‘K( )’ for objects (as a logical constant, of course) to do this:
(DK) K(a) =de f ∼(∃P)(P(a)∧ ∼P(a))
Since we do not use a second order system here, wemay employ (DK) in that
way that we note ∼K(a) in some line of a derivation if for the object named ‘a’
we could have a line with an instance of the schema: P(a) ∧ ∼P(a). Identity
Elimination then takes the form:
n. <m> P(a) . . . Γ
o. <k> a = e . . . Λ
p. <m,k> P(e) (=E) n,o Γ ∪ λ∪{K(e)}
where the column on the right takes down the sets of normality/consistency
assumptions (or other presuppositions, cf. Bremer 2005, 224–36).e prin-
cipal inconsistent object we are concerned with here is, of course, λ.
An example derivation looks like this:
1. <1> p Premise
2. <> p→∼∼p PC
3. <1> ∼∼p (→E)1,2 {○p}
4. <2> ∼p∨q Premise
5. <1,2> q (∨E)3,4 {○p,○ ∼∼p}
6. <2> p→q (→I)1,5 {○p,○ ∼∼p}
7. <> (∼p∨q)→(p→q) (→I)2,6 {○p,○ ∼∼p}
To return to the truth operators: Saying Tλ is thus simply true: △Tλ. is
does not exclude that Fλ is also simply true: △Fλ.
Now it seems that saying of the Liar that the Liar is false is just what the
Liar is saying
(40) Fλ ≡ λ
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en we might have
(41) FFλ
and this contradicts△Fλ! But to derive (41) we use either
(42) Fλ = λ
taking the sentences as objects and expressing their identity, or
(43) ⊢(Fλ ≡ λ)
which may be a petitio in the argument under consideration, and then sub-
stitution of identicals or substitution of equivalents.
e equivalence thesis (43)may bewrong. And substitution of identicals
is one of those inferences restricted to consistent objects (to which λ does
not belong). Even if (43) is not wrong deriving FFλ supposedly has to use
some form of detachment, which again is restricted to consistent sentences
(to which λ does not belong).
Let us take it that Fλ can be believed and—being bivalent—can be as-
serted. Asserting Tλ or Fλ certainly fulls some purpose, be it in explaining
dialetheism or in arguing with opponents of dialetheism. What about λ it-
self? What could be the purpose of asserting λ when one could assert ∼λ as
well? Can asserting an antinomic sentence have any purpose at all? Believ-
ing λ—as the dialetheist does—is not enough.
Given that the dialetheist is engaged in discussions about dialetheism
it may be important to arm her position by giving an example of what
is a true contradiction. is can be done by arming the antinomy itself,
since we and the dialetheist take assertion to involve being convinced of the
armed sentence being true (being at least true in the dialetheist’s case).
So if asserting α can be taken as asserting Tα (not necessarily △α in the
dialetheist’s case) and Tλ may be useful in a discussion about dialetheism,
asserting λ has its place as well.
Inmemory of the distinction between object- andmeta-language, drop-
ped by the dialetheist, one may call this a meta-assertion of an antinomy.
So there are occasions on which it is rational for a dialetheist to assert a
contradiction.
Are there—apart from the just given purpose of uttering λ as a hid-
den/implied utterance of Tλ—other armative uses of λ? It seems not, since
it seems dicult to come up with a purpose for arming λ. Believing both
Tλ and Fλ (respectively λ and ∼λ) one may—it seems—as well use/arm λ
as ∼λ. But if any (non-meta-)usage of λ corresponds to a usage of ∼λ, there
is no point in asserting λ, it seems.ere seems to be nothing specic to be
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said by using λ; even more so if a dialetheist accepts α ∨ ∼α as a tautology
and rejects the use of disjunctive syllogism with antinomic sentences.
If there is no preference to arm α in contrast to arm ∼α why not
arm both? But again: Apart from conveying or displaying thus that α is
taken as antinomic what is the supposed content of that assertion?
e semantic account of some predicates may speak of some quality/-
structure that entities have to which this predicate applies. Once tertium
non datur is accepted—as it is by standard dialetheists—one either has to
assume that ∼α contains the absence of the qualities/structures contained in
α, which would make it dicult indeed to understand α ∧ ∼α in a mildly
realistic manner, or α and ∼α are seen as exclusive and exhaustive in the
sense that they both contain some quality/structure the absence of both be-
ing (metaphysically) impossible.
Given a substantial theory of truth T may convey some quality of α like
corresponding to a fact, being rationally justied . . .A substantial theory of
falsity should accompany this theory, so that ∼α conveys some quality like
the presence of a negative fact (!), being rationally refutable . . .ese qualities
may co-occur!e dialetheist has to postulate some appropriate epistemo-
logical or metaphysical axioms then.
If the positive and the negative fact tied to the Liar are situated not in
space and time but somewhere in our linguistic representation of the world,
theremay be room for a realist dialetheismwhich sees a purpose in asserting
both λ and ∼ λ. Given a metaphysics of this sort one can commit oneself
by one side of a dialetheia. One takes up the commitment to argue that a
corresponding structure is given. (is position has not to assume that the
goal of armation is truth only, it is rather something being at least true.)
If the felicity conditions of armation/assertion entail that the purpose
of armation is to claim something as being only true, then (by this alone)
dialetheias are not armable. But why should one assume this?
e rst reason seems to be that one is eager to exclude at the beginning
a metaphysical picture of negative facts. e second reason, however, may
rest on pragmatic felicity conditions of assertions as speech acts. Assertion
requires to be pragmatically relevant that there is a commitment to some-
thing which has to exclude something else. If nothing is excluded by what I
assert, I should not have bothered the eort. Now, in the typical presenta-
tion of antinomies (for example by arguing by cases Tα/T∼α) an antinomy α
implies/entails ∼α, and ∼α implies/entails α.us by either of them I assert
what the other says as well. erefore an account that bases the informa-
tional content of a sentence on what this sentences entails (cf. Priest 1987,
118) is of no help in these cases. So far this may point to the arbitrariness
of which side of an antinomy is asserted only. By this reasoning one has no
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sucient reason to arm one side, and thus seems to be in some limbo of
assertion.
One may think choosing just one side of the antinomy gets oneself out
of this problem, an ontology of negative facts doing the rest. Asserting α (or∼α), however, has a point only if the facts corresponding to α and ∼α, which
by the mutual entailment of α and ∼α are put forward by either of them,
are not exhaustive, it seems; something logically or semantically exhaustive
being usually taken as having no informational impact because involving
nothing to be excluded by it.
Negative facts have had a bad press in metaphysics.4 So one better had
not oneself committed to them. Again, however, it seems that a general com-
mitment to negative facts is as superuous as a general acceptance of any
old contradiction being true.e dialetheist accepts only very special “true
contradictions”, namely those unavoidable given basic semantic or set the-
oretical concepts plus universality. e dialetheist, therefore, has to accept
only very special negative facts.e failure of accounting for what the point
of asserting a contradiction might be in terms of informational content or
of what the two sides of the contradiction individually entail requires the
more substantial account in terms of reference to distinct facts. In the case
of Liar-like antinomies these facts consist in the negation of a sentence be-
ing as provable as the sentence itself.ere is no further fact “behind” this.
Since the proof is an existent something one may even speak of a positive
fact here, like the intuitionist bases the claim for ∼α not on the absence of
reasons for α, but on the (positive) proof of  from the premise α (cf. Priest
1987, 87).
us with respect to ordinary sentences (the truth of) ∼α may be the
absence of (the truth of) α, but if α entails ∼α and vice versa, and both are
of interest in as much as the fact corresponding to ∼α is not just the absence
of the fact corresponding to α (as an “ordinary” supervenient negative fact
would be) a substantial metaphysical assumption come to light: Both facts
are substantial (and interesting), and it is a further substantial metaphysical
fact that although they do not stand to each other like contradictory sen-
tences do in PC, not both can be false only [corresponding to the theorem⊢ (∼ (▽α ∧▽ ∼α))].
Given that there is independent ground for ∼α, accepting ∼α does not
exclude accepting α. In contexts we know to be consistent we may reason
to ∼α without independent grounds on the basis of ∼Tα and tertium non
4 At least negative rst-order facts; the absence of all instances of a predicate understood as a
supervenient negative fact has had a better press. Whether all negative facts corresponding
to one side of a dialetheia are supervenient (i.e. non rst-order facts) is not clear and may
go against the spirit of, say, set-theoretical antinomies.
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datur (or some version of this disjunctive syllogism like reasoning). Since in
case of antinomies accepting ∼α does not exclude accepting α, accepting ∼α
should not be the same as rejecting α.
Rejecting α cannot be understood by a dialetheist as arming▽α. Re-
jecting α would thus be incompatible with arming α (i.e. arming Tα).
One needs a distinction then between arming▽α and arming Fα [T∼α].
Sticking with the usage employed above and—arguably—standard logic let
us take arming Fα as rejection and arming▽α as denial of α [Dα].
Whereas there are situations in which a dialetheist accepts both α and∼ α, there are no situations in which a dialetheist accepts and denies α at
the same time. Dialetheism does not accept just any contradiction. is is
one reason—prejudices and puns to the side—why rational argument with
a dialetheist is possible. As the foregoing distinction shows there is, further-
more, one kind of contradiction that (even) a dialetheist cannot support:
(44) ∼(Aα∧Dα)
since Tα and▽α are semantically incompatible.
Another simple point is that no-one (including the dialetheist) can have
pragmatic contradictions: Speech acts being bodily movements that either
occur or do not, there is no pragmatic parallel to having it both ways, i.e.
(45) ∼(Aα∧∼Aα)
is instance of the accepted tautology ∼(α ∧ ∼α) expresses not only a se-
mantic exclusion the dialetheist accepts (and sometimes nevertheless super-
sedes), but the absence of themysterious feat of asserting something and not
doing it at the same time.ere is no pragmatic dialetheism (without a ver-
bal manoeuvre of redening “not asserting” on the lines of “asserting ∼α”).
Having in mind these distinctions and the truth operators intuitively di-
aletheism allows for the truth (not necessarily the validity) of several sen-
tences excluded by the consistency principles:
(46) Bα∧B∼α [believing a contradiction]
(47) B(α∧ ∼α)
(48) BTλ∧BT∼λ [being semantically explicit about λ]
(49) BFα∧BF∼α
ere is some spreading of believed or asserted contradictions in those para-
consistent logics in which ∼(α∧∼α) is a theorem or which are extended with
the usual principle of closure of belief.en we may have, for example:
226 Why and how to be a Dialetheist
(50) B(λ ∧ ∼λ)∧B(∼(λ∧ ∼λ))
More controversial may be corresponding principles of assertion:
(51) Aα∧A∼α
(52) ATα∧AT∼α
(53) AFα∧AF∼α
(54) A(α∧ ∼α)
(55) Aα∧Rα [invalidating Aα →∼Rα and Rα →∼Aα]
Given the truth operators some new principles (and their duals), however,
are in force now:
(56) B△α →∼BFα
(57) A△α →∼AFα
(58) R△α →BFα
(59) ∼A(△α∧Fα)
(60) ∼B(▽α∧Tα)
us without sliding into mystery or being silenced one can be a dialethe-
ist and claim some crucial antinomies to be true. Dialetheism itself is not a
paradoxical statement, but the theory that ts the aspirations of an univer-
sally minded philosophy.
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